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Abstract
With the advent of high-performance computing, Bayesian methods are increas-
ingly popular tools for the quantification of uncertainty throughout science and
industry. Since these methods impact the making of sometimes critical decisions in
increasingly complicated contexts, the sensitivity of their posterior conclusions with
respect to the underlying models and prior beliefs is a pressing question for which
there currently exist positive and negative results. We report new results suggesting
that, although Bayesian methods are robust when the number of possible outcomes
is finite or when only a finite number of marginals of the data-generating distri-
bution are unknown, they could be generically brittle when applied to continuous
systems (and their discretizations) with finite information on the data-generating
distribution. If closeness is defined in terms of the total variation metric or the
matching of a finite system of generalized moments, then (1) two practitioners who
use arbitrarily close models and observe the same (possibly arbitrarily large amount
of) data may reach opposite conclusions; and (2) any given prior and model can
be slightly perturbed to achieve any desired posterior conclusions. The mechanism
causing brittlenss/robustness suggests that learning and robustness are antagonis-
tic requirements and raises the question of a missing stability condition for using
Bayesian Inference in a continuous world under finite information.
The application of Bayes’ theorem in the form of Bayesian inference has fueled an on-
going debate with practical consequences in science, industry, medicine and law [21]. One
commonly-cited justification for the application of Bayesian reasoning is Cox’s theorem
[15], which has been interpreted as stating that any ‘natural’ extension of Aristotelian
logic to uncertain contexts must be Bayesian [34]. It has now been shown that Cox’s the-
orem as originally formulated is incomplete [28] and there is debate about the ‘naturality’
of the additional assumptions required for its validity [1, 20, 29, 31], e.g. the assump-
tion that knowledge can be always represented in the form of a σ-additive probability
measure that assigns to each measurable event a single real-valued probability.
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However — and this is the topic of this article — regardless of the internal logic,
elegance and appealing simplicity of Bayesian reasoning, a critical question is that of the
robustness of its posterior conclusions with respect to perturbations of the underlying
models and priors.
For example, a frequentist statistician might ask, if the data happen to be a sequence
of i.i.d. draws from a fixed data-generating distribution µ†, whether or not the Bayesian
posterior will asymptotically assign full mass to a parameter value that corresponds
to µ†. When it holds, this property is known as frequentist consistency of the Bayes
procedure, or the Bernstein–von Mises property.
Alternatively, without resorting to a frequentist data-generating distribution µ†, a
Bayesian statistician who was also a numerical analyst might ask questions about stabil-
ity and conditioning: does the posterior distribution (or the posterior value of a particular
quantity of interest) change only slightly when elements of the problem setup (namely
the prior distribution, the likelihood model, and the observed data) are perturbed, e.g. as
a result of observational error, numerical discretization, or algorithmic implementation?
When it holds, this property is known as robustness of the Bayes procedure.
This paper summarizes recent results [46, 47] that give conditions under which
Bayesian inference appears to be non-robust in the most extreme fashion, in the sense
that arbitrarily small changes of the prior and model class lead to arbitrarily large
changes of the posterior value of a quantity of interest. We call this extreme non-
robustness “brittleness”, and it can be visualized as the smooth dependence of the value
of the quantity of interest on the prior breaking into a fine patchwork, in which nearby
priors are associated to diametrically opposed posterior values. Naturally, the notion of
“nearby” plays an important role, and this point will be revisited later.
Much as classical numerical analysis shows that there are ‘stable’ and ‘unstable’
ways to discretize a partial differential equation, these results and the wider literature of
positive [8, 13, 19, 37, 38, 53, 56] and negative results [3, 17, 23, 24, 35, 40] on Bayesian
inference contribute to an emerging understanding of ‘stable’ and ‘unstable’ ways to
apply Bayes’ rule in practice.
The results reported in this paper show that the process of Bayesian conditioning
on data at finite enough resolution is unstable (or “sensitive” as defined in [54]) with
respect to the underlying distributions (under the total variation and Prokhorov metrics)
and the source of negative results similar to those caused by tail properties in statistics
[2, 18]. The mechanisms causing the stability/instability of posterior predictions suggest
that learning and robustness are conflicting requirements and raise the question of a
missing stability condition for using Bayesian inference for continuous systems with
finite information (akin to the CFL stability condition for using discrete schemes to
approximate continuous PDEs).
Bayes’ Theorem and Robustness
To begin, consider a simple example of Bayesian reasoning in action:
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Problem 1. There is a bag containing 102 coins, one of which always lands on heads,
while the other 101 are perfectly fair. One coin is picked uniformly at random from the
bag, flipped 10 times, and 10 heads are obtained. What is the probability that this coin
is the unfair coin?
The correct probability is given by applying Bayes’ theorem:
P[A|B] = P[B|A]P[A]
P[B]
=
1
1 + 101× 2−10 ≈ 0.91, (1)
where A is the event ‘the coin is the unfair coin’ and B is the event ‘10 heads are
observed’. If the number of coins is not known exactly and the supposedly fair coins
are not exactly fair, then Bayes’ theorem produces a robust inference in the following
sense: if the fair coins are slightly unbalanced and the probability of getting a tail is
0.51, and an estimate of 100 coins is used and an estimate 12 of the fairness of the fair
coins is used, then the resulting estimate 1
1+99×2−10 is still a good approximation to the
correct answer. Observe also that if the prior estimate of the number of coins in the
bag is grossly wrong (e.g. 106) then the posterior would still be accurate in the limit of
infinitely many coin flips: in this case, the Bayesian estimator is said to be consistent.
Do these conclusions remain true when the underlying probability space is continuous
or an approximation thereof? For example, what if the random outcomes are decimal
numbers — perhaps given to finite precision — rather than heads or tails?
The General Problem and its Bayesian Answer
Problem 2. Let X denote the space in which observations/samples take their values,
and let M(X ) denote the set of probability measures on X . Let Φ: M(X ) → R be
a function4 defining a quantity of interest. Let the data-generating distribution µ† ∈
M(X ) be an unknown or partially known probability measure on X . The objective is
to estimate Φ(µ†) from the observation of n i.i.d. samples from µ†, which we denote by
d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ X n.
Example 1. When X is the real line R, a prototypical example of a quantity of interest
is Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a], the probability that the random variable X distributed according
to µ exceeds the threshold value a. However, the results that we report below apply to
any pre-specified quantity of interest Φ.
The Bayesian answer to this problem is to model µ†’s generation of sample data as
coming from a random measure on X and to condition Φ with respect to the observation
of the n i.i.d. samples. This is done by choosing a model class A ⊆ M(X ) and a
probability measure pi ∈ M(A) which we call the prior. This prior determines the
randomness with which a representative µ ∈ A is selected, and, for each such µ ∈ A,
the generation of n i.i.d. samples d ∈ X n by randomly sampling from µn naturally
4All spaces will be topological spaces, the term ‘function’ will mean Borel measurable function and
‘measure’ will mean Borel measure.
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determines a product measure onA×X n. The prior estimate of the quantity of interest is
Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)] and, for an open5 B ⊆ X n, the posterior estimate is defined as the conditional
expectation Eµ∼pi,d∼µn [Φ(µ)|d ∈ B] with respect to this product measure.
The connection to the standard presentation of Bayesian inference in terms of a prior
on a parameter space is as follows: to construct a model class A ⊆ M(X ) and a prior
pi0 ∈ M(A) from a Bayesian parametric model P : Θ →M(X ) defined on a parameter
space Θ equipped with a prior p0 ∈M(Θ), one simply pushes forward under the map P.
That is, the model class A ⊆M(X ) is defined by A := P(Θ) and the prior pi0 ∈M(A)
is defined as the push-forward pi0 := Pp0 of p0 by the model P, i.e. pi0(E) := p0(P−1(E))
for measurable E ⊆ A.
Inconsistency under Mis-specification
We now discuss the effects of mis-specification for a Bayesian parametric model P : Θ→
M(X ). It is convenient to denote such a model by P : θ 7→ µ(θ), so that the model class
is A := P(Θ) = {µ(θ) | θ ∈ Θ}. If the model class P(Θ) contains the data-generating
distribution µ†, i.e. if there is some parameter value θ ∈ Θ such that µ† = µ(θ), then
the model is said to be well-specified ; otherwise, it is said to be mis-specified.
For simplicity, consider the classical case where, for each θ ∈ Θ, µ(θ) has a probability
density function with respect to some common reference measure on X , that is µ(θ) =
p( · , θ) dx for some measure dx. Then, for a prior p0 ∈ M(Θ), let pn ∈ M(Θ) denote
the posterior distribution on Θ after observing the data d (see e.g. [5, p. 126]) and push
forward both the prior and posterior to their corresponding measures, pi0 := Pp0 and
pin := Ppn, on M(A).
Now suppose that the model is well-specified and that p0 gives strictly positive mass
to every neighborhood of every point θ ∈ Θ — this assumption of ‘maximal open-
mindedness’ is commonly referred to as Cromwell’s rule [41]. Then, when Θ is finite
dimensional, under suitable regularity conditions, the posterior value of the quantity
of interest Eµ∼pin
[
Φ(µ)
]
converges to Φ(µ†) as n → ∞. This convergence, which can
be shown to be asymptotically normal, is commonly referred to as the Bernstein–von
Mises theorem or Bayesian central limit theorem [8, 19, 38, 56]. However, for infinite-
dimensional Θ and with similar regularity and strict positivity assumptions, there is
a wealth of positive [13, 37, 53] and negative results [3, 17, 23, 24, 35, 40] showing
that the truth/falsity of the Bernstein–von Mises property depends sensitively on subtle
topological and geometrical details.
Conversely, if the model is mis-specified, then, under regularity conditions [7, 36,
37, 52], the posterior value Eµ∼pin
[
Φ(µ)
]
converges as n → ∞ to Φ(µ(θ∗)), where θ∗
maximizes the expected log-likelihood function θ 7→ Eµ†
[
log p( · , θ)]. If, in addition, µ†
is absolutely continuous with respect to each µ(θ) for θ ∈ Θ, then θ∗ can also be shown to
minimize the Kullback–Leibler divergence or relative entropy distance θ 7→ DKL
(
µ†
∥∥µ(θ))
from µ† to µ(θ).
5We assume B to be open and of strictly positive measure to avoid problems associated with condi-
tioning with respect to events of measure zero.
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Example 2. To illustrate this, let X = R and consider the Gaussian model where µ(c, σ)
is a Gaussian with mean c and standard deviation σ, that is, it has the probability density
p(x, c, σ) :=
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(x− c)
2
2σ2
)
,
and therefore the expected log-likelihood is
Eµ†
[
log p(·, c, σ)] = −∫
R
(x− c)2
2σ2
dµ†(x)− log σ − log
√
2pi.
If, for a data-generating distribution µ† with finite second moments, we let c† denote its
mean and σ† its standard deviation, then a quick calculation shows that θ∗ = (c∗, σ∗)
maximizes the expected log-likelihood if and only if c∗ = c† and σ∗ = σ†. Hence, the
asymptotic Bayesian posterior estimate of Φ(µ†) is Φ
(
µ(c†, σ†)
)
, irrespective of what the
quantity of interest Φ might be. However, there are many different probability distri-
butions µ on R that have the same first and second moments as µ† but have different
higher-order moments, or different quantiles. Predictions of those other moments or
quantiles using the Gaussian distribution µ(c†, σ†) can be inaccurate by orders of magni-
tude. A simple example is provided by the tail probability Φ(µ) := Pµ
[|X − cµ| ≥ tσµ],
where cµ and σµ denote the mean and standard deviation of µ, and t > 0. Under the
Gaussian model,
Pµ
[|X − cµ| ≥ tσµ] = 1 + erf (− t√
2
)
,
whereas the extreme cases that prove the sharpness of Chebyshev’s inequality — in which
the probability measure is a discrete measure with support on at most three points in R
— have
Pµ
[|X − cµ| ≥ tσµ] = min{1, 1
t2
}
.
In the case of the archetypically rare ‘6σ event’, i.e. t = 6, the ratio between the two
is approximately 1.4 × 107. This comparison is, of course, almost perversely extreme:
it would be obvious to any observer with only moderate amounts of ‘Chebyshev-type’
sample data that the data were being drawn from a highly non-Gaussian distribution.
However, it is not inconceivable that the true distribution µ† has a Gaussian-looking
bulk but also has tails that are significantly fatter than those of a Gaussian, and the
difference may be difficult to establish using reasonable amounts of sample data; yet, it
is those tails that drive the occurrence of ‘Black Swans’, catastrophically high-impact
but low-probability outcomes.
Although it is understood that Bayesian estimators can be inconsistent if the model
is grossly mis-specified, a pressing question is whether they have good convergence prop-
erties when the model class {µ(θ) | θ ∈ Θ} is ‘close enough’ to the truth µ† in an
appropriate sense.
Such concerns can be traced back to Box’s dictum that “essentially, all models are
wrong, but some are useful” [12, p. 424] and question “how wrong do they have to be
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to not be useful?” [12, p. 74]. These queries are also critical because, although gross
mis-specification of the model can be detected before engaging in a complete Bayesian
analysis [32, 61], usually one cannot be sure that the model is well-specified.
To answer these questions we will examine the robustness of Bayesian inference by
computing optimal bounds on prior and posterior values in terms of given sets of priors.
Indeed, the exploration of classes of Bayesian models is one response to the concern that
the choice of prior-likelihood combination could, to some degree, be arbitrary, and forms
the basis of the approach known as robust Bayesian inference [4, 6, 11, 58, 60]. To do
so, we need some definitions.
Definition 1. For a model class A ⊆ M(X ), a quantity of interest Φ: A → R, and a
set of priors Π ⊆M(A), let
L(Π) := inf
pi∈Π
Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)
]
U(Π) := sup
pi∈Π
Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)
]
denote the optimal lower and upper bounds on the prior values of Φ. For B a non-empty
open subset of the data space X n, let ΠB ⊆ Π be the subset of priors pi such that the
probability that d ∈ B is nonzero, i.e. Pµ∼pi,d∼µn [d ∈ B] > 0, and let
L(Π|B) := inf
pi∈ΠB
Eµ∼pi,d∼µn
[
Φ(µ)
∣∣d ∈ B]
U(Π|B) := sup
pi∈ΠB
Eµ∼pi,d∼µn
[
Φ(µ)
∣∣d ∈ B]
denote the optimal lower and upper bounds on the posterior values of Φ given that d ∈ B.
Brittleness under Infinitesimal Perturbations
Consider again the model P : Θ → M(X ) but now denote the model class by A0 :=
P(Θ) = {µ(θ) | θ ∈ Θ} and the prior by pi0 ∈ M
(A0). To quantify perturbations in
the model, and define what it means for two distributions to be close to one another,
we select a metric ρ on M(X ). As illustrated in Figure 1, for α > 0, we enlarge the
set A0 to its metric neighborhood Aα and thereby naturally determine a set of priors
Πα ⊆ M(Aα) such that the random measure µα associated with every piα ∈ Πα lies
within distance α from the random measure µ0 associated with the prior µ0 and the
Bayesian model P. Then we analyze the robustness of its posteriors, as in Definition 1,
with respect to these size-α perturbations.
To that end, suppose that X is metrizable and select a consistent metric d for X .
Let B(X ) denote the Borel subsets of X . We will consider two metric distances ρ(µ, ν)
between µ, ν ∈M(X ): ρ will be either the total variation (TV) metric
ρTV(µ, ν) := sup
{|µ(A)− ν(A)|∣∣A ∈ B(X )},
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Figure 1: The original model class A0 (black curve) is enlarged to its metric neighbour-
hood Aα (shaded). This procedure determines perturbations µα ∈ Aα of the original
random measure µ0 ∈ A0.
or the Prokhorov metric6
ρP(µ, ν) := inf {ε > 0 |µ(A) ≤ ν(Aε) + ε, A ∈ B(X )} ,
where Aε := {x ∈ X |d(x,A) < ε}. For α > 0, the neighborhood Aα of A0 emerges
naturally from the ball fibration
A∗ := {(µ1, µ2) ∈M(X )×M(X ) ∣∣µ1 ∈ A0, ρ(µ2, µ1) < α},
in the sense that if P0 and Pα denote the projections onto the first and second components
of M(X ) ×M(X ), then P0A∗ = A0 and PαA∗ = Aα. Consequently, a natural set of
priors Πα ⊆M(Aα) corresponding to pi0 ∈M(A0) is defined by
Πα :=
{
piα ∈M(Aα)
∣∣ for some pi ∈M(A∗), P0pi = pi0 and Pαpi = piα}.
To state our result, consider again Problem 2, and let some xn := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n
be a point such that we observe that d ∈ Bnδ :=
∏n
i=1Bδ(xi), where Bδ(x) ⊆ X is the
open ball of radius δ centered on x ∈ X . Using the notation of Definition 1, and Πα
defined above in terms of the TV or Prokhorov metric, the Brittleness Theorem 6.4 of
[47] then reads as follows7:
6The TV metric is generally considered to generate too strong a topology on the space M(X ) of
probability measures, and the weak topology is generally considered more appropriate, see e.g. [9].
Fortunately, when X is separable, this topology is metrized by the Prokhorov metric. For a thorough
discussion regarding metrics on spaces of measures see e.g. [49].
7All results of this paper and those in [46, 47, 48] require some mild technical measure-theoretic and
topological assumptions. For example, here it is sufficient if P(Θ) is a Borel subset of a Polish space (a
separable completely metrizable space). Unfortunately, M(X ) is not generally separable with respect
to the TV metric, and hence is not Polish. However, if X is Polish, then M(X ) topologized by weak
convergence is Polish and the Prokhorov metric provides a complete metrization of it. Consequently,
when Θ is Polish, X is Polish, and P is injective and measurable with respect to the weak topology,
it then follows from Suslin’s Theorem that P(Θ) is a Borel subset of the Polish space M(X ). For a
thorough investigation of such matters, illustrating the benefits of Polish spaces as the foundation for
the framework, see [47].
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Theorem 1. If
lim
δ↓0
sup
x∈X
sup
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)[Bδ(x)] = 0, (2)
then, for all α > 0, there exists δ(α) > 0 such that for all 0 < δ < δ(α), all n ∈ N and
all xn ∈ X n,
L(Πα|Bnδ ) ≤ ess infpi0(Φ) and ess suppi0(Φ) ≤ U(Πα|Bnδ ) ,
where ess infpi0(Φ) := sup{r | pi0[Φ < r] = 0} and ess suppi0(Φ) := inf{r | pi0[Φ > r] = 0}.
Note that condition (2) is extremely weak and satisfied for most parametric Bayesian
models. Furthermore, suppose that Cromwell’s rule is applied. Then, although it implies
consistency if the model is well-specified, here it leads to maximal brittleness under local
mis-specification. More precisely, under Cromwell’s rule, ess infpi0(Φ) = infµ∈A0 Φ(µ)
and ess suppi0(Φ) = supµ∈A0 Φ(µ), so the conclusion of Theorem 1 becomes
L(Πα|Bnδ ) ≤ inf
µ∈A0
Φ(µ) and sup
µ∈A0
Φ(µ) ≤ U(Πα|Bnδ ) .
In other words, the range of posterior predictions among all admissible priors is as wide
as the deterministic range of the quantity of interest Φ.
Note that since Φ is arbitrary, the brittleness described in Theorem 1 is not limited
to a quantile or moment of µ but concerns its whole posterior distribution.
Brittleness under Finite Information
One response to the concern that the choice of prior and model are somewhat arbitrary
[58] is to perform a sensitivity analysis over classes of priors and models. One way to
specify a class Π of admissible priors pi is to select some ‘features’ (such as the polynomial
moments, or other functionals) and specify some values, ranges, or distributions for those
features. It is interesting to understand the impact of the features left unspecified, i.e. the
codimension and not just the dimension of Π; while robust Bayesian inference [4, 6, 11,
60] has shown that posterior conclusions remain stable when Π is finite-dimensional,
our results can be interpreted as saying that brittleness ensues whenever Π has finite
codimension, regardless of how large its codimension is. It is important to note that
this is in some sense the generic situation: when A is an infinite set, one would have to
specify infinitely many features of priors pi ∈ Π to achieve a finite-dimensional Π; from
a computational and epistemic standpoint, the specification of infinitely many features
in finite time appears to be somewhat problematic.
To study this problem, we introduce a representation space Q (e.g., prototypically,
Rk) and a mapping Ψ: A → Q from the subset A ⊆ M(X ) into Q, which can be
thought of as a map to ‘generalized moments’. Let Q ⊆ M(Q) be a subset of the set
of probability distributions on Q such that each distribution Q ∈ Q has its support
contained in Ψ(A). If the set Q represents priors for the distribution of Ψ(µ), µ ∈ A,
then a naturally induced set of priors Π on A is the pull-back Π := Ψ−1(Q) ⊆ M(A),
defined by Ψ−1(Q) := {pi ∈M(A) | Ψpi ∈ Q}.
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Example 3. Consider the case X = [0, 1], A :=M([0, 1]), and Φ(µ) = Eµ[X]. Thus, the
aim is to estimate the mean Φ(µ†) = Eµ† [X] of the random variable X corresponding to
some unknown measure µ† ∈ A and we observe d = (d1, . . . , dn), n i.i.d. samples from X.
Let k be fixed and let Ψ(µ) = (Eµ[X], . . . ,Eµ[Xk]) be the map to the first k polynomial
moments. If we write a point q ∈ Rk in terms of its coordinates q := (q1, . . . , qk), then
Ψ−1(q) is exactly the set of measures µ ∈M([0, 1]) such that Eµ[Xi] = qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Now define a measure Q on the truncated moment space Ψ(M([0, 1]) ⊆ Rk as follows.
Since the first moment Eµ[X], µ ∈ M([0, 1]), ranges over the unit interval, consider the
uniform measure on the unit interval in the first coordinate. Next define the conditional
measure when the first coordinate is q1 ∈ [0, 1] to be uniform on the range of the second
moment
[
infµ:Eµ[X]=q1 Eµ[X2], supµ:Eµ[X]=q1 Eµ[X
2]
]
. Repeat this conditioning process
on the higher coordinates iteratively in the same manner. Then, the induced set of priors
Π := Ψ−1Q onM([0, 1]) is the set of measures pi such that, when µ ∼ pi, the distribution
of (Eµ[X], . . . ,Eµ[Xk]) is Q.
We now state the Brittleness Theorem 4.13 in [47] for the general case of Problem 2,
and apply it to Example 3. To that end, let the model class A ⊆M(X ) be chosen along
with a generalized moment map Ψ: A → Q to a representation space Q. Let Q ⊆M(Q)
be a specified set of priors on Q and from them determine Π := Ψ−1(Q) ⊆M(A) as the
induced set of priors. For fixed (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, let Bnδ :=
∏n
i=1Bδ(xi) where Bδ(x) is
the open ball of radius δ centered on x ∈ X . The following theorem gives optimal bounds
on posterior values for the class of priors Π defined above, given that the observation
d ∈ Bnδ .
Theorem 2. Suppose that, for all γ > 0, there exists some Q ∈ Q such that
Eq∼Q
[
inf
µ∈Ψ−1(q),i=1,...,n
µ[Bδ(xi)]
]
= 0 (3)
and
Pq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q):µ[Bδ(xi)]>0,i=1,...,n
Φ(µ) > sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ)− γ
]
> 0 . (4)
Then
U(Π∣∣Bnδ ) = sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ),
with similar expressions for the lower bounds L.
In other words, if there is a measure Q ∈ Q such that for Q-almost all q ∈ Q there is
a µ ∈ Ψ−1(q) which achieves an arbitrarily small mass on one of Bδ(xi), i = 1, . . . , n, and
with non-zero Q probability there is µ ∈ Ψ−1(q) which almost extremizes Φ while putting
positive mass on allBδ(xi), i = 1, . . . , n, then the range
[L(Π∣∣Bnδ ),U(Π∣∣Bnδ )] of posterior
values for Φ is exactly the ‘deterministic’ range of Φ, i.e.
[
infµ∈AΦ(µ), supµ∈AΦ(µ)
]
.
Conditions (3) and (4) are very weak and simple dimensionality arguments suggest
that they are typically satisfied if Q is finite-dimensional. Hence, although Bayesian
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inference is robust in situations where the distributions of all but finitely many gener-
alized moments of the data-generating distribution µ† are known, Theorem 2 suggests
that it is brittle when the distributions of only finitely many generalized moments of
µ† are known, while infinitely many remain unknown. As an example, it is instructive
to observe how Theorem 2, applied to Example 3 in [47, Ex. 4.16], shows that if the
data-generating measure has some non-atomic component, then when the number of
samples n is large enough and δ small enough, the optimal bounds on posterior values
of Φ(µ) = Eµ[X], given the distribution Q defined on its moments, are 0 and 1.
To quantify “large enough” and “small enough” and to remove the “non-atomic”
requirement above, Theorem 3.1 of [46] provides a quantitative version of Theorem 2
in which the conditions of the theorem are only required to hold approximately. When
applied to Example 3 with the set Π := Ψ−1Q of priors generated instead by the uniform
prior Q restricted to the truncated moment space, Theorem 3.3 of [46] establishes that,
although the prior value satisfies U(Π) = 12 , the posterior value satisfies
1− 4e
(2kδ
e
) 1
2k+1 ≤ U(Π|Bδ) ≤ 1 . (5)
Consequently, regardless of the number of moment constraints k, and the location of
a single data point, for δ smaller than an elementary known function of k, we have
brittleness. This result also holds for arbitrary multiple samples. Remark 4.18 of [47]
also suggests that brittleness would persist if the hard bound δ to specify measurement
uncertainty is replaced by a level of noise with variance decreasing with δ.
Mechanism Causing Brittleness
We will now illustrate one mechanism causing brittleness with a simple example derived
from the proof of Theorem 1. In this example we are interested in estimating Φ(µ†) =
Eµ† [X] where µ† is an unknown distribution on the unit interval (X = [0, 1]) based on the
observation of a single data point d1 =
1
2 up to resolution δ (i.e. we observe d1 ∈ Bδ(x1)
with x1 =
1
2).
Consider the following two models µa(θ) and µb(θ) on the unit interval [0, 1], param-
eterized by θ ∈ (0, 1), and with densities fa and f b given by
fa(x, θ) = (1− θ)(1 + 1θ)(1− x) 1θ + θ(1 + 11−θ)x 11−θ ,
f b(x, θ) =
{
fa(x, θ) 1Z
(
1{x 6∈(x1− δc2 ,x1+ δc2 )}
+ 10−91{x∈(x1− δc2 ,x1+ δc2 )}
)
, if θ < 0.999,
fa(x, θ), if θ ≥ 0.999,
where Z is a normalization constant (close to one) chosen so that
∫
[0,1] f
b(x, θ) dx = 1.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of these densities.
Observe that the density of model b is that of model a besides the small gap of width
δc > 0 created around the data point for model b (if θ < 0.999, see Figure 2); since the
data point is fixed at x1 =
1
2 , the total variation distance ρTV
(
µa(θ), µb(θ)
)
between the
two models is, uniformly over θ ∈ (0, 1), bounded by a constant times δc. Assuming that
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(a) fa(x, θ) (b) fb(x, θ)
Figure 2: Illustration of the density fa(x, θ) of model a and f b(x, θ) of model b.
the prior distribution on θ is the uniform distribution on (0, 1), observe that the prior
value of the quantity of interest Eµ[X] under both models (a and b) is approximately
1
2 . Now, when θ is close to one (zero) then the density of model a puts most of its mass
towards one (zero). Observe also that the density of model b behaves in a similar way,
with the important exception that the probability of observing the data under model b
is infinitesimally small for θ < 0.999. Therefore, for δ < δc, the posterior value of the
quantity of interest Eµ[X] under model a is 12 whereas it is close to one under model b.
Observe also that a perturbed model c analogous to b can be constructed to lead to a
posterior value close to zero.
The mechanism described here is generic and µb(θ) is a simple example of what worst
priors can look like after a classical Bayesian sensitivity analysis over a class of priors
specified via constraints on the TV or Prokhorov distance or the distribution of a finite
number of moments.
Can these worst priors be dismissed because they depend on the data? The problem
with this argument is that, in the context of Bayesian sensitivity analysis, worst priors
always depend on (or are pre-adapted to) the data. Therefore the same argument would
lead to a dismissal of Bayesian sensitivity analysis and therefore the framework of robust
Bayesian inference. In some sense, the brittleness results reported here can be seen as
extreme occurrences of the dilation property [59] which, in robust Bayesian inference,
refers to the enlargement of optimal bounds caused by the data dependence of worst
priors. Indeed, even if perturbations are quantified in Kulback–Leibler divergence then,
the local sensitivity analysis (in the sense of Fre´chet derivatives) of posterior values [27]
shows infinite sensitivity as the number of data points goes to infinity (and this result
is valid for the broader class of divergences that includes the Hellinger distance).
Can these worst priors be dismissed because they can “look unrealistic” and make
the probability of observing the data very small? The problem with this argument is
that these worst priors are not “isolated pathologies” but directions of instability (of
Bayesian conditioning) increasing with the number of data points and the complexity
of the system under investigation. We will illustrate this point with another simple
example that will also show that these instabilities are the price to pay for the learning
potential of Bayesian inference.
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Learning and Robustness are Antagonistic Properties
In this example we are interested in estimating Φ(µ†) = µ†[a, 1] for some a ∈ (0, 1), where
µ† is an unknown distribution on the unit interval (X = [0, 1]) based on the observation
of n data point d1, . . . , dn up to resolution δ (i.e. we observe di ∈ Bδ(xi) with xi ∈ [0, 1]
for i = 1, . . . , n). Our purpose is to examine the sensitivity of the Bayesian answer to
this problem with respect to the choice of a particular prior. Consider the model class
A :=M([0, 1]), and the class of priors
Π :=
{
pi ∈M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼pi[Eµ[X]] = m} .
Observe that Π corresponds to the assumption that µ† is the realization of a random
measure on [0, 1] whose mean, is on average m
As in the previous example, the finite co-dimensional class of priors Π leads to brit-
tleness in the sense that the least upper bound on prior values is U(Π) = ma , whereas
(for δ  1/n), the least upper bound on posterior values is the deterministic supremum
of the quantity of interest (over A), i.e. U(Π|Bnδ ) = 1. Furthermore, worst priors are
obtained by selecting priors for which the probability of observing the data µn[Bnδ ] is
arbitrarily close to zero except when Φ(µ) is close to its deterministic supremum.
Can this brittleness be avoided by adding a uniform constraint on the probability
of observing the data in the model class? To investigate this question, let us introduce
α ≥ 1 and a probability measure µ0 on [0, 1] with strictly positive Lebesgue density
(with µ0 being the uniform measure on [0, 1] as a prototypical example) and consider
the (new) model class
A(α) :=
{
µ ∈M[0, 1]
∣∣∣∣ 1αµn0 [Bnδ ] ≤ µn[Bnδ ] ≤ αµn0 [Bnδ ]
}
(6)
and the (new) class of priors
Π(α) :=
{
pi ∈M(A(α)) ∣∣Eµ∼pi[Eµ[X]] = m}
where, in (6), Bnδ :=
∏n
i=1Bδ(xi) and (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n is fixed.
Note that for the model class A(α), the probability of observing the data is uniformly
bounded from below by 1αµ
n
0 [B
n
δ ] and from above by αµ
n
0 [B
n
δ ]. Therefore, for α = 1, the
probability of observing the data is uniform in the model class, prior values are equal to
posterior values, the method is robust but learning is impossible. On the other hand, if
α slightly deviates from 1, then the calculus developed in [47] (theorems 4.8 and 4.13)
gives
lim
δ→0
U(Π(α)|Bnδ ) = 1
1 + 1
α2
a−m
m
=
m
a
α2
+m(1− 1
α2
)
. (7)
Note that the right hand side of (7) is equal to m/a for α = 1 (when the proba-
bility of the data is constant on the model class) and quickly converges towards 1 as α
increases. As a numerical application observe that for a = 34 and m =
a
2 =
3
8 , we have
limδ→0 U
(
Π(α)
)
= 12 and
lim
δ→0
U(Π(α)|Bnδ ) = 1
1 + 1
α2
.
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Therefore, for α = 2, we have (irrespective of the number of data points)
lim
δ→0
U(Π(2)|Bnδ ) = 0.8,
and for α = 10, we have (irrespective of the number of data points)
lim
δ→0
U(Π(10)|Bnδ ) ≈ 0.99.
Moreover, if α is derived by assuming the probability of each data point to be known
up to some tolerance γ, i.e. if the model class A(α) is replaced by
Aγ :=
{
µ ∈M[0, 1]
∣∣∣∣ 1γµ0[Bδ(xi)] ≤ µ[Bδ(xi)] ≤ γµ0[Bδ(xi)], i = 1, . . . , n
}
(8)
for some γ > 1, then it can be shown that
lim
δ→0
U(Π|Bnδ ) =
1
1 + 1
γ2n
,
which exponentially converges towards 1 as the number n of data points goes to infinity.
In conclusion, the effects of a uniform constraint on the probability of the data
under finite information in the model class shows that learning ability comes at the
price of loss in stability in the following sense: when α = 1, the data is equiprobable
under all measures in the model class, posterior values are equal to prior values, the
method is robust but learning is not possible. As α deviates from one, the learning
ability increases as robustness decreases, and when α is large, learning is possible but
the method is brittle.
Qualitative Robustness and Consistency
Since the data dependence of worst priors is inherent to classical Bayesian sensitivity
analysis, one may ask whether robustness could be established under finite information
by leaving the strict framework of robust Bayesian inference and computing the sensi-
tivity of posterior conclusions independently of the specific value of the data. Indeed, in
the current classical Bayesian sensitivity analysis framework, given a class of priors Π
and the observation d ∈ Bnδ (x), we compute
sup
pi,pi′∈Π
∣∣∣Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)|d ∈ Bnδ (x)]− Eµ∼pi′[Φ(µ)|d ∈ Bnδ (x)]∣∣∣,
which corresponds to the sensitivity of posterior values (given the value of the data)
with respect to the particular choice of prior pi ∈ Π. Therefore, the interpretation of
the brittleness mechanisms discussed above should be limited to the significance of such
optimal bounds, which are not the sole measure of robustness of a Bayesian estimation.
An alternative analysis could be to quantify the sensitivity of the distribution of posterior
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values. For instance, given a class of priors Π ⊂ M(X ) over a model class A ⊆ M(X ),
the value of
sup
pi,pi′∈Π,ν∈A
Px∼νn
[∣∣Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)|d ∈ Bnδ (x)]− Eµ∼pi′[Φ(µ)|d ∈ Bnδ (x)]∣∣ ≥ ].
is the least upper bound on the probability that, posterior values derived from pi, pi′ ∈ Π
and randomized through an admissible candidate ν ∈ A for the distribution of the data,
deviate by at least  > 0. This form of analysis is directly related to Hampel [30]
and Cuevas’ [16] notion of qualitative robustness, which requires closeness in distribu-
tions of the posterior distribution rather than in posterior distributions. More precisely,
given a metric ρ2 on M(M(A)), a qualitative sensitivity analysis would seek to bound
ρ2(pi∗νn, pi′∗νn) (over pi, pi′ ∈ Π and ν ∈ A) where pi∗νn ∈M(M(A)) is the distribution of
the posterior distribution of the prior pi ∈M(A) when the data d = (d1, . . . , dn) is ran-
domized through νn. If, unlike Hampel and Cuevas who require “closeness for all n”, we
follow Huber [33] and Mizera [44] in only requiring closeness “for large enough n” (i.e. in
the limit as the number of data points tends to infinity) then we obtain [45] a notion of
qualitative robustness where the notion of consistency (i.e. the property that posterior
distributions convergence towards the data generating distribution) plays an important
role. Although consistency is primarily a frequentist notion, according to Blackwell and
Dubins [10] and Diaconis and Freedman [17], consistency is equivalent to intersubjective
agreement which means that two Bayesians will ultimately have very close predictive dis-
tributions. Fortunately, not only are there mild conditions which guarantee consistency,
but the posterior distributions can be shown to contract/concentrate at an exponential
rate around the data generating distribution (see [55] for rates of contraction of posterior
distributions based on Gaussian process priors) and the Bernstein–von Mises theorem
goes further in providing mild conditions under which the posterior is asymptotically
normal [13, 14]. The most famous of these are Doob [19], Le Cam and Schwartz [39],
and Schwartz [50, Thm. 6.1].
Unfortunately, the conditions ensuring consistency (e.g. the condition that the prior
has Kullback–Leibler support at the parameter value generating the data8) are such
that arbitrarily small (TV or Prokhorov) local perturbations of the prior distribution
(near the data generating distribution) may result in consistency or non-consistency, and
therefore may have large impacts on the asymptotic behavior of posterior distributions
[45]. A simple illustration of this mechanism is as follows [45]. Suppose that the data
generating distribution ν is at distance τ > 0 from the support of the prior pi. Let pi1
be a prior distribution with all of its mass on/around ν (having KL support at ν). Take
pi′ := (1 − )pi + pi1. The total variation distance from pi′ to pi is bounded by  which
can be chosen to be arbitrarily small. Furthermore, pi′ inherits the KL support of pi1 at
ν and by Schwartz’ consistency theorem [50] its posterior distribution converges (almost
surely) towards a Dirac concentrated at ν as n → ∞. On the other hand the distance
between the support of the posterior distribution of pi and ν remains bounded by τ . This
8 pi ∈M(M(X )) is said to have Kullback–Leibler support at ν ∈M(X ) if pi{µ ∈M(X ) | ∫X dνdµdν ≤
} is strictly positive for all  > 0
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simple example exposes a serious challenge to proving robustness in the TV metric or
any weaker metric, such as those used in the convergence of MCMC.
Of course, in a parametric setting, if the parameter space Θ is compact and the model
well-specified (the data is generated from a parameter in that space), then, choosing a
prior satisfying Cromwell’s rule (putting mass in the KL neighborhood of all parame-
ters) ensures qualitative robustness (and the degree of robustness is a function of how
much mass is placed in each neighborhood). However, if Θ is compact and the model is
misspecified then, even if the prior is nice and smooth, the mechanism discussed above
suggests that it is not qualitatively robust (with a degree of non-robustness correspond-
ing to the degree of misspecification and the prior does not need to look “unrealistic”
to be non-qualitatively-robust). Note also that if Θ is non-compact then the prior can-
not be qualitatively robust (because no matter how small  is, one can always find a
neighborhood of the parameter space having mass smaller than ).
In a non parametric setting, consistent priors (such as the ones analysed in [55]
with bounds on convergence rates) remain good/natural choices when their posterior
distributions can be computed. However, consistency and robustness are to some degree
conflicting requirements [16, 45] from the point of view a numerical analyst. Consider,
for instance, the problem of using a sophisticated numerical Bayesian model to predict
the climate where Bayes rule is applied iteratively and posterior values become prior
values for the next iteration. How do we make sure that our predictions are robust, not
only with respect to the choice of prior but also with respect to numerical instabilities
arising in the iterative application of the Bayes rule? The non-robustness mechanisms
discussed here suggest that, unless the prior is chosen carefully and, unless we have a tight
control on numerical instabilities/errors/approximations at each step of the iteration, our
final predictions might be unstable. Note that, oftentimes, these posterior distributions
(which are later on used as prior distributions) are only approximated (e.g. via MCMC
methods), how do we go about ensuring the stability of our method in such situations?
The brittleness results discussed here suggest that having strong convergence of our
MCMC method in TV would not be enough to ensure stability. Note in particular that
although quantifying perturbations in KL ensures qualitative robustness it would also
require controlling the convergence of the MCMC method in KL or in a stronger metric.
Conclusion and Perspectives
It is possible that an analogy can be made between the brittleness and robustness prop-
erties of Bayesian inference and the numerical analysis of PDEs, for which many patholo-
gies and also many necessary and/or sufficient stability conditions are known. However,
in contrast to conditions such as the well-known Courant–Friedrichs–Lewy condition for
PDEs, the question of the existence and of the nature of a stability condition for using
Bayesian Inference under finite information remains to be answered. Although numer-
ical schemes that do not satisfy the CFL condition may look grossly inadequate, the
existence of such perverse examples certainly does not imply the dismissal of the neces-
sity of a stability condition. Similarly, although one may, as in the example provided
in Figure 2, exhibit grossly perverse worst priors, the existence of such priors does not
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invalidate the need for a study of stability conditions for using Bayesian Inference un-
der finite information. The example provided in (7) suggests that, in the framework of
Bayesian sensitivity analysis, such a stability condition would depend on (i) how well the
probability of the data is known or constrained in the model class (ii) the resolution at
which the quantity of interest is conditioned upon the data. Note that the independence
of the brittleness threshold δc from the number of data points n in Theorem 1 suggests
that taking δ fixed and n → ∞ does not prevent brittleness in the classical Bayesian
sensitivity analysis framework (it only leads to more directions of instabilities). On the
other hand, for a fixed δ, (5) suggests that brittleness results do not persist in that same
framework when the number of moment constraints k (on the class of priors) is large
enough. Furthermore, taking δ > 0 fixed (or discretizing space at a resolution δ > 0)
enables the construction of of classes of qualitatively robust priors (to TV perturba-
tions) that are nearly consistent as n → ∞ (some degree of consistency is lost due to
the discretization). At a higher level, the mechanisms discussed here appear to suggest
that robust inference (in a continuous world under finite-information) should perhaps
be done with reduced/coarse models rather than highly sophisticated/complex models
(with a level of “coarseness/reduction” depending on the available “finite-information”).
A close inspection of some of the cases where Bayesian inference has been successful
suggests the existence of a non-Bayesian feedback loop on the evaluation of its perfor-
mance [43, 51, 42]. Therefore, one natural question is whether the missing stability
condition could also be derived by exiting the strictly Bayesian framework, as proposed
in [21]. One example of such an approach could be that of posterior predictive checking
[26], [25, p. 159] whose rationale is to detect model mismatch by generating replicate data
from the model, and comparing this replicate data to the original data using statistics
related to the quantity of interest.
It is natural to expect that robustness and stability questions will increase in impor-
tance as Bayesian methods increase in popularity due to the availability of computational
methodologies and environments to compute the posteriors. Another strong motivation
for considering Bayesian methods and investigating such questions is the complete class
theorem, which, in the adversarial game theoretic setting of Decision Theory [57] asserts
that optimal statistical estimators (leading to optimal decisions as defined by a convex
loss function on a compact parameter space) live in the Bayesian class of estimators
[57, 22].
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